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ARGUMENT 
I. THE UNIVERSITY'S INTERPRETATION OF DR. MACDONALD'S 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED. 
The University concedes that its "obligations to [Dr. Macdonald] respecting contract 
renewal and retention reviews are contained in the offer of employment, the University of 
Utah Policy and Procedure Manual, Policy 9-2, and the RPT policy."1 Brief of Appellee at 
II. The University also now concedes that the Retention Policy mandates that the University 
review the employment of clinical track faculty, such as Dr. Macdonald, "on an annual 
basis." Id. at 8. Therefore, it should be undisputed that Dr. Macdonald was entitled to a 
retention review before the University decided whether or not to retain her as an employee. 
Although the Retention Policy makes no explicit or implicit exception for retention 
reviews, the University insists that the Retention Policy be interpreted to mean that Dr. 
Macdonald was entitled to the retention review procedures outlined in the policy in certain 
years only, not "on an annual basis" as the Retention Policy requires. To support this 
inherently inconsistent argument, the University cites to language in the Retention Policy 
referring to employment reviews occurring in the third year of employment and then in 
several-year intervals thereafter. The University argues that these specifically enumerated 
year reviews are the only reviews in which the retention procedures set forth in the Retention 
Policy are to be followed. Yet the University cites not a single provision anywhere in the 
1
 "RPT policy" stands for Retention, Promotion and Tenure Policy and will be referred 
hereinafter as the "Retention Policy." 
1 
Retention Policy or other controlling documents that states or infers that the review 
procedures of the Retention Policy should be followed in certain year reviews only as 
opposed to others.2 Nor can it. 
The Retention Policy makes no distinction whatsoever in the procedures that are to 
be followed in conducting annual retention reviews versus retention reviews that occur in 
specifically enumerated years only.3 Moreover, it would be entirely inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Retention Policy as well as its specific provisions to conclude that Dr. 
Macdonald was not entitled to the safeguards of a retention review prior to being terminated. 
First, the employment policy at issue here is a Retention Policy. The Retention Policy, 
as its name suggests, sets forth policies and procedures to be followed when deciding 
whether or not to retain faculty, including a number of procedural safeguards afforded to 
faculty members when their retention is at issue. Because clinical track faculty employment 
contracts expire annually, it would eviscerate the very purpose of the Retention Policy if it 
were interpreted to afford retention safeguards beginning only in the third year of 
employment, two years after the first decision regarding retention is to occur. 
2
 As noted in the Appellant's opening brief, the University's new Retention 
Policy—revised after this lawsuit was filed—now draws a distinction between informal and 
formal reviews, the latter implicating the review procedures outlined in the Retention Policy; 
however, no such distinction existed in the version of the Retention Policy operative during 
Dr. Macdonald's employment. 
3
 It may be that the reviews that occur after three years of employment and 
periodically thereafter are meant to focus on issues related more to promotion rather than 
retention. After all it is a Retention, Promotion and Tenure Policy. Still the Retention Policy 
is silent on any supposed distinction among the reviews named in the policy. 
2 
Second, the University's self-serving interpretation is also at odds with its own 
employment offer to Dr. Macdonald, which the University concedes is part of her 
employment contract, and which promises that Dr. Macdonald's superiors "will work with 
[her] toward meeting the criteria for reappointment and retention reviews." R. at 115. 
Because the employment offer was for one year only, it is unreasonable to conclude that Dr. 
Macdonald was not entitled to a retention review until her third year. 
This conclusion is also supported by other language in the Retention Policy. The 
Retention Policy states, as the University notes in its brief, that "[t]he decision whether to 
renew or not to renew a clinical track faculty appointment rests with the department chair." 
Id. at 8 (quoting R. 147). Again, because all clinical track faculty appointments expire 
annually, the decision to renew or not renew faculty like Dr. Macdonald must necessarily be 
made before the contract expires, that is, annually. Further, because the Retention Policy sets 
forth specific procedures the department chair must follow in making these decisions, it 
follows that Dr. Macdonald was entitled to the safeguards of these procedures before any 
decision was made in her case. Hence, the Retention Policy's requirement that clinical track 
faculty be "reviewed by the department on an annual basis." R. at 164. 
In sum, the University's fundamentally flawed interpretation completely ignores the 
Retention Policy's expressly stated requirement that the University afford clinical track 
faculty Members a retention review on an "annual basis." Because the University's 
interpretation fails to consider "'each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the others, 
3 
with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none'"it must be rejected as a matter of 
law.4 See Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ^|17, 84 P.3d 1134 (citations 
omitted). 
II. THE UNIVERSITY'S DECISION NOT TO RENEW DR. MACDONALD'S 
CONTRACT WAS A RETENTION DECISION. 
As discussed in more detail in Appellant's opening brief, choosing not to renew Dr. 
Macdonald's employment contract was a retention decision, as it effected her continued 
employment with the University. See, e.g., Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 
P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah 1981) (holding college should have afforded faculty member 
protections of retention policy before deciding not to renew his one-year contract); see also 
Cherry v. Utah State Univ., 966 P.2d 866 (1998). The University does not take issue in its 
brief with this fact. Indeed, the University barely mentions Piacitelli or Cherry, and does not 
distinguish their extremely analogous and persuasive holdings. 
Instead, the University makes much ado about the fact that retention is an 
administrative action and that deference must be paid to the Department's decisions. Dr. 
4
 The University's argument that Dr. Macdonald had no right to a retention review 
because her contract automatically expired every year is a red herring. While it is true that 
Dr. Macdonald's contract expired annually, it is equally true, as discussed above, that the 
Retention Policy required the department chair to make a decision "whether to renew or not 
to renew" Dr. Macdonald's contract before it expired. SeeR. 147. The Retention Policy also 
set forth the procedures to be followed in making such a decision. See R. at 165,281-82. 
Here, the University followed the first part of the policy, making a decision regarding Dr. 
Macdonald's retention before her contract expired but ignored the second part of the policy, 
denying Dr. Macdonald the procedural safeguards required by the Retention Policy to make 
sure the retention decision was a fully informed and fair one. 
4 
Macdonald does not dispute this unremarkable fact. Clearly the University maintains the 
right to determine what faculty members it wishes to retain and what faculty members it 
wishes to terminate. What the University cannot do, however, is ignore its own policies and 
procedures in making these decisions. Therefore, its arguments about deference are much 
ado about nothing. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY STRONGLY FAVORS GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
HONORING THEIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. 
The University argues that public policy favors the University's interpretation of its 
contract. The University is wrong. Public Policy strongly favors parties, especially 
governmental entities, honoring their contractual obligations. In this instance, the 
University's contractual interpretation would turn employment with the University into a 
game of Russian roulette, with some faculty being afforded the procedural safeguards of a 
retention review with other, less fortunate, faculty being denied this protection all depending 
on the year in which the University happens to decide whether to retain them. Making 
employees subject to the whimsical timing of a "some years you're protected, some years 
you're not" policy would severely undermine prospective employees' confidence in working 
for the University and inhibit the University in its efforts to attract the best employees 
possible. In a broader perspective, without the assurance that public institutions will honor 
their contractual obligations, they would not be able to attract the people necessary to fulfill 
important public sector positions. 
5 
The University's reliance on Moore v. Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d 634, 643 
n.33 (Utah 1986), to argue that the public interest is best served by interpreting the contract 
in a way that would allow it to retain "flexibility in hiring faculty"3 reveals once again the 
University's basic misapprehension of the question at issue here. Dr. Macdonald has never 
argued that the University's decision-making ability should be curtailed in any manner. Dr. 
Macdonald has only asserted that the University's decision-making process should conform 
to its own policies and procedures, procedures which also benefit the University by helping 
it better evaluate the contributions and potential of its employees before making decisions 
affecting their retention. 
Finally, the University's argument that "any doubt" regarding the correct 
interpretation of the employment agreement "should be resolved in favor of the University's 
interpretation"6 flatly contradicts well-established law. As set forth more fully in the 
Appellant's opening brief, ambiguous contracts must be construed against the drafter, in this 
case, the University. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, 99 P.3d 796 
(reaffirming ambiguities, whether arising from ambiguous language in a particular contract 
provision or from seemingly clear provisions, which, when read together, give rise to 
different or inconsistent meanings, must be construed against drafter). 
5
 Brief of Appellee at 19. 
6 M a t l 8 . 
6 
IV. THE UNIVERSITY VIOLATED THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING. 
The University violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing separate and apart 
from its breach of contract. At a minimum, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
required the University to deal fairly with Dr. Macdonald in discharging its obligation under 
their contract. See, e.g., Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1047 (Utah 1989) 
("[T]he duty of good faith is 'unconditional and independent in nature' and requires the 
parties to deal fairly with each other . . . .") Contrary to this obligation, the University's 
department chair, Dr. Stevens, held a very brief meeting in which he made false 
representations about Dr. Macdonald's performance to the very people he was asking to 
confirm his recommendation not to retain her. R. at 9-10,160 and 301. This was essentially 
the sum total of the information these doctors were given.7 Thus, in addition to being denied 
the retention processes to which Dr. Macdonald was entitled, Dr. Stevens' false statements 
forever tainted Dr. Macdonald's ability to be evaluated fairly by the reviewing committee. 
The University denies that Dr. Stevens made these false statements, and therefore has raised 
a genuine issue of disputed fact precluding summary judgment on this issue. See UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 56(C). 
7
 This incident further highlights the importance of affording faculty like Dr. 
Macdonald the retention review process they were promised, which would have given all the 
voting members of the faculty the opportunity to assess Dr. Macdonald's performance for 
themselves rather than relying on one person's biased opinion. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those discussed in Appellant's opening brief, the 
judgment of the trial court dismissing Dr. Macdonald's breach of contract claim should be 
reversed and judgment should be entered as a matter of law in favor of Dr. Macdonald. The 
trial court's judgment dismissing Dr. Macdonald's breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing claim should also be reversed, remanding the same to the trial court for further 
action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /( day December, 2006. 
HOOLE & KING, L.C. 
Roger H. Hoole 
Gregory N. Hoole 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Nancy Macdonald, M.D. 
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